

ABSTRACTS

Virgil CIOMOȘ, *Der Genuss und seine Mehrdeutigkeit*, pp. 9-26

An original authenticity of the human being is to be found even in the inauthenticity of everyday life. Freud was the first to determine the purely pleasurable essence of every symptom, including the psychotic one. This fact represents a real challenge for the analytical clinic, since it is often the case for the subjects to even love their symptom more than themselves. Consequently, it is not the pleasure representing the place of the subject's own inscription, but its complementary symptom. From this point of view, there can be no real desire without a painful symptom. "Pain-lust" (Schmerzlust) is the expression we find appropriate for this proviso. For more clarity, it is important to emphasize: not pleasure in itself causes pain, but that what it is carried on its behalf, namely the symptom along with its peculiar pain. The conclusion drawn by Lacan from all these genuinely Freudian developments is one potentially "scandalous" for some Freudians: the symptom - be it a painful one - is the only place where some kind of "revelation" takes place. The symptom is nothing else than a form of "remnant radiation", like in quantum mechanics. According to Freud, the whole idea of psychoanalysis is an attempt to prove that "the transcendental" (i.e. the primary psychic energy which is asexual and sublimated, as far as Freud understands it) cannot "show" itself under any form, not even as "failure" or symptom. This raises the important question with regard to the possibility of finding the original enjoyment (jouissance) as a self-chosen and adopted experience of astonishment not only as a necessary transition caused by the "fall" in the native language. Our answer to such question is affirmative, provided that both phenomenology and psychoanalysis insist on the fact that the subject is guided by sublimation towards the experience of the sublime itself. This means also the restoration of one's own unique Self. From a psychoanalytic (Lacanian) perspective, such implication is linked to the therapeutic function of art.

Keywords: authenticity, symptom, pain, lust, transcendental, pleasure, sublimation, Freud, Lacan.

Rolf KÜHN, *Verbot und Transgression als Dialektik des Begehrens. Eine analytisch-phenomenologische Grundfrage in Auseinandersetzung mit Jacques Lacan*, pp. 27-42

As a psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan differentiated in his late period (starting from 1960) between the impossibility of symbolic representation covering the real (*le réel*) and the enjoyment (*jouissance*), which only partially subject itself to such signifiers and therefore generates a real residue – i.e. the "object a". This "object a", which differs from the imaginary object, represents a non-assimilable excess occurring as the cause of desire (*désir*). On the other hand, it refers back to the intrinsically concealed presence of "object a" as the origin of fear. In this way, the desire appears puzzling and solidifies itself in the phantasm of the "partial object" (Freud), which is believed to be the "Other" (A). The psychoanalytic cure consists in crossing this phantasm in order to give up the original identification; that is, to see the tension between the desire for recognition and the demand of the need (*besoin*) and thereby to dissolve it. For Lacan, the Freudian unconscious is thus a simultaneous opening and closing, the pulsation of which excludes depth and inwardness. Insofar as the subject is split between the singular truth of desire

and a general knowledge about it, this truth really comes to speech only when it is acknowledged the fact that “no language can ever tell the truth about the truth”. (Lacan, 1966, p. 246).

Keywords: jouissance, fear, original identification, Freud, Lacan, desire, truth.

Giuliana GREGORIO, *Die Lust beim späten Foucault*, pp. 43-64

In the general context of Foucault’s genealogy of the modern subject, his reflections about pleasure are especially relevant. That is because he reconsiders from the radical perspective of the essential and controversial relationship between pleasure, desire, and truth the whole history of the Western civilization, starting with Ancient Greece. This essay puts into question Foucault’s search for a new and different “economy of bodies and pleasures”. If, on the one hand, the French thinker emphasizes the ethical-political valence of the “use of pleasure” (and above all, its emancipatory potential regarding the subjection/subjectivation dialectics), on the other hand, he seems to remain torn by an unresolved tension between an ‘ascetic’ tendency and the seduction of dissipative drifts.

Keywords: Foucault, subject, pleasure, desire, sexuality, Ancient Greece.

Jonas HODEL, *Lust zwischen ästhetischer Selbst- oder Ideenliebe und religiösem Leidenwollen beim frühen Kierkegaard*, pp. 65-82

The aim of this paper is to offer a provisional, though coherent overview of the different phenomenal aspects of lust (dan. Lyst) with respect to the three existential stages stated by Kierkegaard. It proceeds in four steps: first, Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety and its relation to personal freedom is introduced as background for the question of how lust comes about in the individual. Second, it exposes the aesthetic character of lust, consisting in the fulfilment of a multitude of desires rather than in any of their specific objects themselves. A third step reconstructs the main critique of the hedonistic ‘view of life’ as articulated from the ethical standpoint. The dialectic of religious joy as an intentional suffering for a higher form of fulfilment is being analyzed in the final step.

Keywords: existential stages, anxiety, individual, hedonism, ethics, religious joy.

Joana Luisa GÜNTHER, *Die Lust in Nietzsches Werk*, pp. 83-98

The joy of creation plays a crucial role in Nietzsche’s philosophy. The ‘found of joy’ never stops welling up for Zarathustra and the flow is almost too painful for him. The phenomenon of joy in Nietzsche’s work is very complex. Hence, in this paper I will concentrate on the utmost kind of joy that emerges in the end of *Thus spoke Zarathustra* in the *Drunken Song*. It is the joy to create a work of art and to integrate even sorrow in this utmost kind of joy. Joy takes place at noon, in the moment when oppositions are in harmony and beauty. In this paper, the aim is to interpret especially the last quote of the *Drunken Song*, when *all joy wants eternity*. Eternity is a kind of wholeness that is not similar to absoluteness and only possible in the specific movement of creation. Therefore, joy of creation seems to be the joy of a moment when opposites unite.

Keywords: joy, eternity, moment, creativity, The Drunken Song, oppositions, will, work, depth.

Antonino SPINELLI, *Der unmerkliche Mangel und die Natur der Seele Zur „wahren Lust“ in Platons Philebos*, pp. 99-121

The account of “true pleasure” plays a fundamental role in Plato’s *Philebus*. It allows to distinguish, within the vast and varied sphere of pleasure, between those pleasures which hinder the realization of the good life and those that promote it and have to be accordingly admitted, alongside knowledge, among the elements of the best life. This paper focuses on a controversial

passage (Phlb. 51b3–7), in which true pleasure is said to involve an “imperceptible lack”, which does not cause any suffering, as opposed to the painful lack which accompanies the lower “mixed” pleasures linked to sensible desires and passions. The passage seems to suggest that both false and true pleasure correspond to a general model based on the restoration of an original natural state through the compensation of a lack. I argue that this parallel is only extrinsic, since the nature which is restored is in the two cases of a totally different type. In lower pleasure it is the psycho-physical balance of the organism that has to be restored, whereas in true pleasure the human soul comes closer to its original nature, which was corrupted during incarnation, by perceiving beautiful objects and by acquiring knowledge.

Keywords: Plato, *Philebus*, true pleasure, soul, imperceptible lack.

Alina NOVEANU, *Vom »Wille« zur »Lust des Seyns«: Heidegger liest Nietzsche und Schopenhauer*, pp. 123-144

Despite the filiation granted by Nietzsche and the adoption of his basic themes, Schopenhauer remains just a “tumbler” for Heidegger (Heidegger 2008, pp. 106-108). His few remarks scattered across various lectures, criticize Schopenhauer’s arrogant-offended tone and his habit to abuse the academic philosophy with insults. However, Heidegger is very much interested in the issue which keeps suspended Schopenhauer’s philosophy and, at the same time, continues to be central in Nietzsche’s work, i.e. the ways in which the will affects our representation of the world. Even though there is a very strong resemblance with regard to the idea of negation of the will in both Heidegger and Schopenhauer, no reference to Schopenhauer’s solution against an almighty (yet cruel and selfish) will is present in the Heideggerian call for serenity (*Gelassenheit*). The more resolutely Heidegger wants to tackle the metaphysics of the will as the core of the “oblivion” of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*), the more intensely the debate of Nietzsche’s philosophy becomes. The questioning of the nature of metaphysics represents the starting point. The same as Nietzsche, Heidegger explores beyond the metaphysics’ historic categories of being, at the same time criticising for being “nihilistic” his attempt to create new “values” or any other mental design that may block the access to “being” itself. Heidegger’s counter-draft to metaphysics and its ultimate consequence (i.e. nihilism as understood by Heidegger), is a kind of gentle approach (*Annäherung*) which “lends voice” to being: the *Zustimmung* also can be read as mere “consent” to being and, as such, an overcoming of classical metaphysics.

Keywords: will, *Gelassenheit*, *Seinsvergessenheit*, being, values, nihilism, consent, metaphysics

Joachim H. SCHNEIDER, *Eine Metareflexion über die psycho-physikalische Verfasstheit des Schmerzes und die Resilienz Erfahrung*, pp. 145-164

The lack of objectivity in experiencing pain is a given fact, regarding the multiplicity of individual reactions. Research, so far, indicates pain as having structural analogy with human cognition. What is clinically detectable concerning pain are its acute and chronic phases. In the chronic phase, pain begins to be structurally fixed in the brain. We have reliable data showing that both the course and the means for understanding chronic pain can be traced back in early childhood as much as in fully developed, matured individuals. Beside this real core of personal traumatic history, there is another kind of pain which could be described as purely cognitive. We will call it “metaphysical pain”. This type of pain is caused by the mortality / immortality difference. Blaise Pascal was one who bodily felt this particular pain. Psychologists use the concept of “resilience” in order to describe the mechanism which could provide an easy explanation for the problems implied by it. To sum up: there is nobody who does not suffer from some kind of trauma. But, at the same time, everybody has the force of resilience. In this

paper, the idea that resilience is a natural gift endowed to all humans is developed. Thus, it can be seen as a natural, universal trait of human thought.

Keywords: pain, acute, chronic and metaphysical, resilience.

Mara FISCHER, *Über Furcht und Angst bei Martin Heidegger*, pp. 165-189

In *Sein und Zeit*, as well as in his *Was ist Metaphysik?* lecture, Heidegger coined an unusual concept of fear. We call it unusual because, instead of a strictly negative connotated feeling, he sees in fear a chance of growth, as different possibilities of human existence may appear. "Freed" through fear, one can realize its own possibilities of existence and can authentically be oneself. This kind of existential fear may prove to be for the individual human being a fruitful self-confrontation. However, such a possibility only arises if the individual is ready to face several phenomena which confront him with his own finitude. In this context, are crucial for Heidegger's analysis of fear the references to the call of conscience (i.e. the *Gewissensruf*), freedom, guilt, death and temporality.

Keywords: mood, fear, conscience, temporality, be oneself, death, reversal, authenticity

Marcel HOSU, *Eine geschichtsorientierte Kritik der Zeitlichkeit mittels der aristotelischen Lustkonzeption in Giorgio Agamben's Frühwerk*, pp. 191-209

The essay looks at the few and short, but strikingly significant references that Giorgio Agamben makes to pleasure throughout his work. Starting with an analysis of history, I discuss his critique of the concept of time, which, in his book *Infancy and History*, culminates with a reflection on the Aristotelian concept of pleasure.

Keywords: pleasure, history, time, kairos, universality, inoperativity, pornography.

Radu ȚURCANU, *"The Pain of Existing" and Desire for the Contemporary Subject*, pp. 211-223

The first issue that I shall address here is that of the difference between existence and being, using primarily the psychoanalytical approach of Freud and Lacan, rather than the philosophical one, which I leave to the specialists. The point I want to stress therefore is related to a simple inquiry: if existence is referred to reality issues such as things and bodies, being would rather concern the identity of those things and bodies which exist. For instance, if angels do indeed exist, what is their sex, what is their being made of, what is their identity? In the same way, if "unicorns exist", what are they, animals, intermediate beings, or some supernatural instances? This debate around being and existence took place in modern philosophy (phenomenology, Heidegger, Kripke, Gould), but was also a fundamental problematic for Freud when he invented psychoanalysis.

Keywords: psychoanalysis, unconscious, subject, existence, ex-sist, being, desire, jouissance.