

ABSTRACTS

Dietmar KOCH, *Über den »Hohen Schmerz«. Überlegungen im Blick auf die Dialoge Platons*, pp. 23-35

The “higher pain” means being able to suffer for the highest goal, the outmost that actually gives our lives a determination. In the German phrase “Leidenschaft für etwas” (passion for something), one can always hear the suffering, the being afflicted with something. This talk focuses on Plato’s sentence from Phaedrus (274b) and interprets it in a certain relation between “paschein and poiein” (274b): “Someone who wants to fulfill or explicate the (idea of) beauty daringly, also suffers in a beautiful way, whatever one has to suffer from”. This sentence, however, has one premise: The single person who accepts the pain of carrying something out needs to be amazed by something beautiful, needs to make an experience as being befallen by something. The “pain of carrying something out” grounds in an initial “joyful pain”. This initial joyful pain in turn gives birth to a pleasure that is able to suffer from carrying something out. The latter grounds in this pleasure aiming at suffering for the thing itself and is upheld by it. The higher pain as a pain for the grand itself requires a *metabolé tes psyches* to the (idea of) beauty itself respectively the (idea of the) good itself. This *metabolé* alone grants the access to the outmost. The difference between the *Doxophilia* and *Philosophia* in the Republic V (476b and 479d – 480a) is in our context decisive and explicates the overall context. *Doxophilia* – referring to something beautiful and also being able to undergo pain for something – remains in the picture without knowing or recognizing that it is a picture of the (idea of) beauty itself. Philosophy alone is capable of answering to the entirety of that something.

Keywords: higher pain, passion, *doxophilia*, Plato, beauty

Ralf ELM, *„Süße des Lebens“, „Schmecken des Schönen“ und höchstes Gelingen. Hêdonê und Eudaimonia bei Aristoteles*, pp. 37-60

The topic of the phenomena joy, lust or pleasure (*hêdonê*) is repeatedly astonishing and at the same time a quite ambivalent field for Aristotle. His numerous statements about the *hêdonê* made throughout the work, his basic definitions and systematic analyzes, in particular the two so-called pleasure treatises in the 7th and 10th book of *Nicomachean Ethics* and their consideration in the examination of emotions in the second book of *Rhetoric* are very stimulating. In my lecture, I would first like to (I) visualize some of the phenomenal diversity that Aristotle had in mind. In a second step (II) I will briefly introduce Aristotle’s engagement with anti-hedonism in his first treatise (*EN VII 12-15*) and introduce his understanding of pleasure as “unhindered activity”. This is then deepened in the third section (III) with Aristotle’s second treatise on pleasure (in *EN X 1-5*) and his second suggestion of pleasure as a “perfection that comes to perfection”. That self-referential relationships always play a role in lust and displeasure, for which the elementary corporeality is just as important as the intersubjectivity of friendships (for example, in the context of Aristotle’s political philosophy) is addressed in the final section (IV).

Keywords: hedonism, activity, perfection, corporeality, intersubjectivity, self-affirmation of life, friendship.

Ion COPOERU, *Schmerz, Ausgesetztsein und Identität*, pp. 61-74

The biomedical model in healthcare does not sufficiently address the way patients experience and give meaning to their altered body and world. Therefore, phenomenological analyses have been performed in order to open the access and bring forward the (personal, subjective) experience of sufferers, be it physical, psychic or social. In this framework, pain and suffering are usually seen as disruptive for a person's sense of his or her own body. Some particular experiences, that the phenomenological analysis will help me unravel, will serve as arguments in favor of the idea that what is at stake in pain and suffering is the becoming of the subject as subject. How can this auto-affecting subject be described? Two ways of phenomenalisation of the subject have been taken into consideration, based on their concepts of lived sense and, respectively, movement.

Keywords: pain, trauma, exposure, phenomenalisation of the subject, identity, lived sense, movement.

Livia DIOȘAN, *Symptom and Jouissance*, pp. 75-102

In Freud's example of the rat man, the symptom is jouissance: the signifying sequence of the story with the rats had awakened in the patient's body a jouissance of which Freud managed to read the horror of a jouissance ignored by him. If the symptoms are at the origin of a demand for an analysis, then the symptoms bear witness to the existence of the unconscious and, also, the way in which they are formed pertains to the encounter between the words and the body. At the beginning of psychoanalysis, the symptom disappears under the effect of the interpretation, but some subjects, faced with the possibility of curing the symptoms that made them suffer, preferred to preserve them. Thus, the interpretation of the symptom as metaphor only suits its definition of belonging to the symbolic register, but it neglects satisfaction. Or, precisely satisfaction is an essential axis because the symptom is a sort of reparation, that is a way of saying that it constitutes an option of satisfying what has not been satisfied in the drive circuit. The notion of "real of the symptom", as Lacan puts it, brings coherence between the symptom and the unconscious starting from the real. By inscribing the symptom between the symbolic and the real, Lacan does not define it anymore as metaphor, but by the effect of the symbolic on the real, insisting on the notion of jouissance in the symptom. In this way, the sense of a psychoanalysis is given by the reduction of the meaning that was masking the jouissance. The Lacanian perspective defines the unconscious as a means of jouissance of symptom, hence the analytical operation modifies the subject's program of jouissance.

Keywords: symptom, jouissance, anxiety, unconsciousness, analysis.

Cristian BODEA, *What do We Suffer from? The Phenomenology of Affect in Lacanian Psychoanalysis*, pp. 103-117

This paper gives an account on the problem of suffering using two complementary approaches: the phenomenological and the psychoanalytical one. Considering anguish as suffering, it emphasises on the fact that both methodological approaches are aiming the same thing, namely the experience of the sublime as a way to give suffering another meaning. Based on the difference between affect and passion, the other meaning the suffering can get is the one of openness to the transcendence of otherness.

Keywords: analytical act, anguish, desire, otherness, the Real, suffering, sublime

Flaviu Victor CÂMPEAN, *The Lack of the Body and the Body of Writing in Kierkegaard*, pp. 119-136

Søren Kierkegaard existed only through his work, which comprises his literary and philosophical pseudonymous oeuvre, the *Journal* and the theological bodies of work. When unable to nourish this vivid production anymore, he launched his attack against the church in a

periodical called the *Instant*, an effort he could not sustain for too long. In the midst of the attack he fell violently ill in the street in Copenhagen and died in hospital, without having previously been diagnosed with a serious or fatal illness. On the other hand, his body has always been rendered as a failure, even as a missing element in some passages that reveal symptoms of different kinds of hypochondria. These are due to what he confesses to be an “excess of spirit”, a hyper-spiritual subject that enacted a peculiar melancholic and incorporeal condition. The failing body pertains to the lack of an effective body that could sustain existence and at the same time enforces the solution to the question concerning the unavoidable ek-sistence in anxiety (Heideggerian *avant la lettre*) by way of an incorporeal body of writing. In this paper I will point out the connections between the function of Kierkegaard's writing as a vehicle for shaping identity and the metaphors of the failing body, using a psychoanalytical approach, while trying at the same time to keep close to Kierkegaard's own style of allusions and bitter irony as an attempt to save the unique subject by writing.

Keywords: body, lack, writing, substitution, melancholia, pseudonyms, anxiety, ek-sistence.

[Alina NOVEANU, *Über den Schmerz: Heidegger – Jünger – Lenz*, pp. 137-153](#)

Physical pain is by definition not a matter of sharing. The only way to pass the solipsism of the own body is by getting to the source of the original phenomenon (*Urphänomen*) pain, before it has locked itself inside a mute and tortured singularity. The paper proposes a few examples of collective experiences which can lead to what could be called a “tragic” community. Within such a community, pain can be put into a discourse and be this way open for a simultaneous reception. Humans meet over their helplessness and finitude, their thinking about death and also the experience of art, in their worries about technics and the functioning of their work. These are also ways to overcome nihilism, a dangerous threshold (or “line”, with Jünger) whose passing results in existential pain. The way pain can be brought to speech in all these different contexts is shown here by a phenomenological analysis with means offered by Heidegger's philosophy and is put into a dialogue with Siegfried Lenz' essay *Über den Schmerz* and Ernst Jüngers homonymous work.

Keywords: Lenz, community, Heidegger, Jünger, nihilism, *Der Arbeiter*, art, technics

[Jörg MAGENAU, *Marsyas und Apoll. Über den Schmerz und die Entstehung der Kunst*, pp. 155-174](#)

The myth of the confrontation between Apollo and Marsyas, as described in Ovid's *Metamorphoses* has created a long history of diverse interpretations and works of art. The paper follows this history, including its reception in contemporary literature. Further, it tries to fill the gap between visual arts, which are primarily focused on showing the pain of the skinned satyr, and the literary tradition, which is interested in the political and social aspects involved in the genesis of art. The different approaches of the theme are being discussed under one central question that revolves around an unsolved mystery capable to explain the long list of answers throughout art history and the literary tradition of interpretation: Is it the artist the one who creates art, or is it art, the one who creates the artist? Both of the creation processes seem to presuppose a series of painful transformations which lead to a particular kind of knowledge.

Keywords: Ovid, German literature, Art, Pain, satyr, transformation, knowledge

[Niels WEIDTMANN, *Zur Phänomenologie des Schmerzes*, pp. 175-195](#)

In this article I will analyze pain from a phenomenological perspective and demonstrate that it represents a fundamental structure (*Grundphänomen*) of human beings and their world. In the philosophy of mind pain, as one of the most prominent examples for the relevance of the first-person perspective cannot be explained objectively. A phenomenological approach however reveals that first and third person perspectives of pain must not even be distinguished altogether.

Rather than being provoked by an external cause, pain originally accompanies the process of self-differentiation of the human being and the world, i.e. the birth of the human dimension of being or, to put it simply, the birth of human reality. Therefore, pain will be considered as originally referring to the pain of birth. I will outline this interpretation by using reference to Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Rombach. It will be shown that some particular examples in visual arts can help in calling our attention to that dimension of human reality from which the phenomenon of pain originates.

Keywords: phenomenology, pain, fundamental structure, body, Munch, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Rombach.

Philipp THOMAS, *Transformations of the Desired. About the Emotional Pain of Unhappy Love*, pp. 197-207

I will start (section 1) with a description of an intense emotional pain. To be more precise I will start with the first phase of this pain. It is about the pain we feel when something we have infinitely desired becomes impossible to attain. I will describe such a pain using the example of one-sided, unfulfilled love. This will be followed by an excursus: I will try to reconstruct this pain – though only in a simplistic and basic manner – in order to understand it psychoanalytically. Lacan's concept of the *objet petit a* will play a role here.

I will then (section 2) continue by using a phenomenological approach: I will try to describe some kind of second phase of the pain. The pain does not persist through hope and hopelessness forever. Instead, it starts the process of a drastic reconstruction of the self, a transformation causing us to suffer. Then, in the final step (section 3) the third phase of this movement is perceivable. In this phase we are suddenly able to look at what is happening in a completely new way. It is as if an optical illusion has shattered and, in its place, we are able to see the same things but with different eyes, thus bringing about the onset of something completely new in our world (for further aspects of this train of thought cf. the chapter "Transformation: unglückliche Liebe" in Thomas, 2020, p. 215 – 234).

Keywords: love, desire, fulfillment, hopelessness, illusion, transformation.

Mihai OMETIȚĂ, *Schmerzlokalisierung und Körperraum*, pp. 209-231

The paper brings a challenge to Cartesian dualism, while introducing some under-explored manuscript remarks from Wittgenstein's middle period, which are methodologically and thematically akin to some passages from Merleau-Ponty's early period. Cartesian dualism relegates pain to mental awareness and location to bodily extension, thus rendering common localizations of pain throughout the body as unintelligible ascriptions. Wittgenstein's and Merleau-Ponty's attempts at doing justice to common localizations of pain are mutually illuminating. In their light, Cartesian dualism turns out to involve an objectification and a deappropriation of one's body. Moreover, Wittgenstein's unveiling a heterogeneous multiplicity of corporeal spaces (e.g. visual-space, tactile-space, feeling-space) rehabilitates the view, reinforced by Merleau-Ponty, that corporeal pain is intimately related to corporeal localization, while corporeal space is not part of the physical space of things.

Keywords: Schmerz, Raum, Lokalisation, Körper, Descartes, Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty.

Marcel HOSU, *Über den Schmerz, die Transfiguration und die Fruchtbarkeit des Schöpferischen im Denken Nietzsches*, pp. 233-246

The paper offers an overview of the development of the concept of pain in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche beginning with the musical conception of tragedy in his first major work *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music* published 1872 up until the second edition of *The Gay Science* in 1886. It distinguishes between three periods in his thinking with regard to pain by taking into consideration both his published and unpublished works.

Keywords: tragedy, pain, music, choir, metaphysics, pessimism, science, *amor fati*, transfiguration.

Virgil CIOMOŞ, *Schmerz, Symptom, Sublimation. Von der Phänomenologie zur Psychoanalyse*, pp. 247-259

In medicine and psychiatry, pain often falls under the term “comorbid disorder”. We will therefore begin with a brief phenomenological analysis of the term “comorbidity”. The emphasis here will not be so much on “morbidity” but on the prefix “co”, more precisely on the fusion between the various forms of morbidity, including the pain itself. I would like to further state that the real thing that comorbidity is concerned with is essentially the interaction between the organic and the psychic, or, generally speaking, that between “body” and “soul”. The prefix “co” can denote at least three possible situations, depending on the respective context: an organic cause with psychological effects, a psychological cause with organic effects, or, a much deeper source of origin, which is both organic as also affects the psychic and thus leaves behind the mere duality of this pair of terms. As we shall see, this last meaning became the source of inspiration for one of the important working hypotheses of phenomenology, which is the reduction of dualisms as body-soul, inside-outside, etc. from the perspective of their common condition of possibility. This hypothesis is shared by both psychoanalysis and the psychoanalytic clinic that emerges from it.

Keywords: comorbidity, organic, psychic, body, soul, reduction of dualism.